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The purpose of this paper is to study tax competition on a parallel road network when different 
governments have tolling authority on the different links of the network. Reflecting many current 
situations in Europe, each link is used by both local and transit traffic; moreover, transit has a 
choice of route. Each government maximises the surplus of local users plus total tax revenues in 
controlling local and transit transport. Three types of tolling systems are considered: (i) toll 
discrimination between local traffic and transit, (ii) uniform tolls on local and transit transport, 
(iii) local tolls only. The results suggest that the welfare effects of introducing transit tolls are 
large, but that differentiation of tolls between local and transit transport as compared to uniform 
tolls does not yield large welfare differences. It is also found that the welfare effects of 
coordination between countries are relatively small in comparison with the welfare gains of 
tolling transit. The numerical model further illustrates the effects of different transit shares and 
explicitly considers the role of asymmetries between countries. Higher transit shares strongly 
raise the Nash equilibrium transit toll and slightly decrease local tolls. With asymmetric demands, 
the welfare gains of introducing differentiated tolling rise strongly for the country with lower 
local demand.   
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1. Introduction 
Countries’ road networks are usually publicly provided, they are congestible, and they are 
accessible to local and to transit users.  Moreover, in many cases transit users have a 
choice between different jurisdictions’ road networks. For example, there are two main 
routes from South-Central Europe (Switzerland, Austria, Italy) to the north (Belgium, 
Netherlands, Denmark, etc.), one through France, the other via Germany.  Alternatively, 
consider the transalpine crossing between Germany and Italy, where Austria and 
Switzerland compete for transit traffic. In both examples, transit has a choice of routes 
and it interacts with local traffic in each country.   
In these circumstances, how would a local jurisdiction like to price access to its 
infrastructure?
1 In this paper we study this question under various assumptions on the 
type of allowable tolls, for given levels of infrastructure supply. More specifically, we 
look at a model with two parallel routes that are operated by two countries. Local traffic 
and transit traffic both contribute to congestion, and the two countries compete for 
revenue from transit. Assuming that countries maximise a welfare function consisting of 
local consumer surplus and tax revenues from local and transit traffic, we study strategic 
tolling by individual countries under various tolling schemes. First, we assume that local 
traffic and transit can be separately tolled. Second, we look at the case where only 
uniform tolls are possible or acceptable.  Third, we consider the case where only local 
traffic can be tolled. 
Despite the highly stylised setting, the examples referred to above show that the model 
does capture the main ingredients of a number of situations in Europe (North-South axe, 
transalpine crossing, etc.). The analysis of this paper then describes the potential tax 
competition between countries in controlling local and transit transport. Moreover, in 
view of recent innovations in transport taxation within the EU, all three types of tolling 
                                                 
1 Although the discussion is set in the context of congestible road infrastructure in two countries, similar 
issues arise in the public provision of e.g. health, educational and recreational services.  In this sense, the 
ideas studied in this paper are not limited to the transport sector. The key feature of the analysis is that 
foreign (transit) users are not restricted to a particular jurisdiction but can choose between several, and that 
jurisdictions compete for revenue from transit.  
   2
regimes considered are highly policy-relevant. New forms of transport pricing 
instruments include kilometre charges (implemented in Germany as of early 2003), tolls 
(already existing, among others, on French motorways), and cordon pricing (London). 
More sophisticated time-of-day pricing regimes are under consideration. The case of 
differentiated tolls is relevant because, as long as Member States use different tolling 
instruments, the implied local and transit tax levels will almost automatically differ. 
Alternatively, the case of uniform tolls provides an appropriate description when EU 
member countries use the same pricing instruments, because explicit toll discrimination 
between local and transit transport contradicts EU regulations. Finally, the case of ‘local 
tolls only’ is likely to remain extremely important. It resembles the current situation in 
many countries, where fuel taxes are the main tolling instrument. High fuel taxes can 
easily be evaded by transit transport, especially in relatively small countries, so that the 
exclusive use of fuel taxes is similar to tolling local traffic only. It is likely that several 
countries will be limited to tolling local traffic for quite some time, if only because of the 
technical difficulties and implementation costs associated with tolling transit.    
With this background in mind, this paper studies the welfare implications of tax 
competition on a parallel network with local and transit traffic, where the latter is 
assumed to have a choice of route. The analysis builds upon several strands of the recent 
literature. First, the large literature on the optimal pricing of road use in the presence of 
congestion has recently been extended to optimal tolling on simple parallel networks. For 
example, Braid (1996) and Liu and McDonald (1998) consider models with 
homogeneous users to study optimal second-best tolls on one link in the network, 
assuming that other links can not be optimally tolled for technical or political reasons. 
They suggest that the optimal second-best tolls on one link tend to be low, and could 
actually be negative. Moreover, the welfare gains from this type of second-best tolls are 
found to be low. However, more recent research by Small and Yan (2001) and Verhoef 
and Small (2003) shows that allowing for a heterogeneous population of road users 
substantially increases the benefits from second best tolls.   
Second, a small but growing literature does explicitly study the role of different 
ownership regimes in models with parallel routes. For example, Verhoef et al. (1996)   3
consider competition between a private road and a free-access road, and compare the 
second-best optimal tolls with those obtained when both roads are privately owned.  De 
Palma and Lindsay (2000) use a bottleneck model of congestion and compare three types 
of ownership structure: a private road competing with a free access road, two competing 
private roads, and competition between a private and a public operator. Note, however, 
that these papers do not incorporate both transit and local traffic demand and, therefore, 
do not deal with tax competition for transit by welfare maximising governments.   
Third, a few recent studies have looked specifically at tax exporting in the transport 
sector, within a serial network setting.  Levinson (2001) analyses US States’ choice of 
instruments for financing transportation infrastructure. Theory predicts, and an 
econometric analysis confirms, that jurisdictions are more likely to opt for toll-financing 
instead of e.g. fuel taxes, when the share of non-residential users is large.  Tolls become 
more attractive because they allow price discrimination and tax-exporting.  De Borger et 
al (2003) apply a large-scale numerical optimisation model to study tax exporting 
behaviour by individual regions in a model with both domestic and international freight 
transport. However, these models are based on a different network structure, they do not 
consider transit route choice, and they do not study the properties of reaction functions 
and the resulting Nash equilibria. Moreover, they do not look at the broad variety of tax 
instruments dealt with in the current paper. 
Finally, in a slightly broader sense, the welfare evaluation of transport tax competition 
of this paper also complements the few explicit numerical illustrations of the welfare 
effects of various types of tax competition
2. An early example is Wildasin (1989), who 
finds substantial welfare effects of property tax competition in the US. More recently, 
Sorensen (2000) estimates the welfare loss of tax harmonisation within the EU at less 
than 1% of GDP. The welfare losses of capital tax competition have also been estimated 
to be relatively small under some, but not all, scenarios considered (Parry (2003)). 
Finally, Sinn (2003) discusses various forms of ‘systems competition’, referring in 
                                                 
2 Seminal contributions to the tax competition literature include Arnott and Grieson (1981), Mintz and 
Tulkens (1986), and Kanbur and Keen (1993). For a recent survey, see Wilson (1999).   4
general to competition between countries for mobile factors, e.g. within the EU, or on a 
global scale. He finds the welfare effects to be detrimental in some, but not all, cases. 
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. At the theoretical level, it 
fills two gaps in the literature. First, although competition between operators has been 
considered before (see the references given above), a common feature of this work is the 
absence of transit users that can choose between routes. In contrast, our analysis 
incorporates route choice for transit, and it focuses on the interaction between local and 
transit traffic when governments compete for revenue from transit. The distinction 
between local and transit traffic also allows us to explicitly consider a wider range of 
tolling instruments compared to the existing literature. Importantly, it allows us to look at 
the implications of pricing only part of the users (local traffic only), a case that seems 
especially policy-relevant for the near future within the EU. Second, our analysis focuses 
on competition in a parallel network between two local welfare-maximising 
governments. This type of competition seems highly relevant in the context of European 
transport policy and has not been studied in detail in the literature.  
Finally, complementing the theoretical analysis by a stylised numerical illustration 
allows us to pin down orders of magnitude for each of the issues analysed. It allows us to 
shed some light on the welfare effects of introducing various types of tolling instruments, 
the benefits of toll harmonisation, etc. Moreover, the sensitivity of the results to transit 
shares, to congestion differences and to demand asymmetries can easily be evaluated. 
Among others, the numerical results suggest that despite a substantial amount of tax 
exporting, the efficiency costs of tax exporting are fairly small under most scenarios, 
confirming recent results obtained by Parry (2003) in a totally different context. Also, the 
welfare effects of uniform versus differentiated tolls are quite limited. To the contrary, 
using local tolls only is quite costly in welfare terms. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the general theoretical 
model. We specify the characteristics of the network and derive optimal tax rules for a 
given country (implicitly defining the country’s reaction functions) for various types of 
tolling instruments. In Section 3 we simplify by assuming linear demand and cost 
functions; this allows us to explicitly analyse the properties of the reaction functions, as   5
well as the resulting Nash equilibria. Section 4 reports on a numerical illustration. Seven 
equilibria are numerically evaluated: the no-toll equilibrium, Nash with differentiated 
tolls, Nash with uniform tolls, Nash with local tolls only, a centralised solution with 
differentiated tolls, a centralised solution with local tolls only and, finally, a scenario with 
collusion between the countries. The role of the share of transit and of demand and 
congestion asymmetries between countries is evaluated.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The theoretical model 
In this section we first present the structure of the model and provide an overview of the 
tolling systems analysed. We then study the optimal behaviour of an individual country 
for each of the cases considered. Throughout this section we focus on the economically 
most interesting results; most of the derivations are relegated to appendices. 
 
2.1  Structure of the model and the pricing schemes considered 
We consider the simplest possible setup. The network analysed is depicted in Figure 1. It 
consists of two parallel links, and it is assumed that pricing of each link is the 
responsibility of a different government. Each link carries local traffic, which cannot 
change routes, and transit traffic, which can. Link capacities are given and both links are 
congestible. 
Both governments are assumed to maximise a welfare function that reflects two 
concerns, viz. (i) the travel conditions of its local users and the associated welfare, and 
(ii) total tax revenues on the link it controls. We assume that all traffic flows are 
uniformly distributed over time and are equal in both directions, allowing us to focus on 
one representative unit period and one direction.  
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The combinations of tolling instruments as well as the notation used are summarised in 
Table 1. Note that differentiated tolls for local and transit demand may seem unrealistic 
because it runs against the non-discrimination rules in trade agreements. However, by 
choosing a particular toll structure, countries are able to implicitly price-discriminate 
against foreign users
3. Importantly, note that Table 1 only lists the three cases where both 
countries use the same type of tolling
4. In order not to lengthen the paper substantially, 
we deliberately limit the scope of the analysis to these three cases. However, extension to 




                                                 
3 Take as an example the yearly lump-sum fee for access to a country’s network that is to be paid in 
Switzerland and in many other countries (the Eurovignette system): this in fact boils down to 
discrimination in favour of the local users as, almost by definition, they use the network more frequently. 
4 In principle, we could also examine cases where the governments use different types of tolling systems. 
Indeed, these mixed cases exist in reality: France uses a uniform tolling system for motorways while 
Germany has no explicit toll, so uses a system similar to the case where only local traffic can be tolled.   7
Table 1: The tolling systems studied 
Description of tolling systems 
studied 
Tolling instruments   Example of practical relevance 
Differentiated tolls for local and 
transit transport  
i τ : transit toll region i 
(i=A,B) 
i t : toll on local transport in 
region i (i=A,B) 
Eurovignette (favors more intensive 
local users) 
Uniform tolls for local and transit 
transport 
i θ : uniform toll in region i 
(i=A,B)  
Current tolls on French highways 
Tolls on local users only, no transit 
toll 
i t : toll on local transport in 
region i (i=A,B) 
Fuel taxes, parking charges 
 
Turning to the specification of the model, demand for local transport in A and B is 
represented by the strictly downward sloping inverse demand functions  ( )
Y
AA PY and 
()
Y
BB PY, respectively, where  A Y  and  B Y  are the local flows on both links. The generalised 
prices  (.)
j
i P  include resource costs, time costs and tax payments or user charges. 
Similarly, overall demand for transit traffic is described by the strictly downward sloping 
inverse demand function  ( )
X PX , where X is the total transit traffic flow. We have 
AB X XX += ,                                                                           (1) 
where  A X  and  B X are the transit flows via A and B, respectively.  The two links are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes: transit users choose the route with the lowest 
generalised (money plus time) cost but have no specific preferences towards any of the 
routes.    
Turning to the cost side, the generalised user cost for transit via route A, denoted 
X
A g , 




A AA A A gC X Yτ = ++  
                                                 
5 In what follows, we develop all specifications for the case of differentiated tolling; the cases of uniform 
tolls and local tolls only are easily derived by analogy.   8
 In this expression,  (.) A C  is the time plus resource cost on route A, assumed to be strictly 
increasing in the total traffic volume. Similarly, the generalised user cost for local use of 
route A is given by  ()
Y
A AA A A gC XYt = ++ . 
User costs for route B are defined in an analogous way. 
Since we assume perfect substitutability between links for transit, in equilibrium the 
generalised cost for transit equals the generalised cost on the link with the lowest 
generalised cost.  If both routes are used, transit traffic will be distributed across links so 
as to equalise generalised costs. Specifically, the Wardrop principle implies that  
              
() ( ) 0
() ( ) 0
XX
AA A A A A
XX
BB B B B B
PX g CX Y i f f X





                                   (2) 
Moreover, equilibrium for local traffic implies 
() ( )
YY
A AA A A A A PY g CX Y t = =+ +                    ( 3 )  
() ( )
YY
BB B B B B B PY g CX Y t = =+ +                    ( 4 )  
Unless otherwise noted, we focus on the case where all types of traffic exist in 
equilibrium, i.e., there is local and at least some transit in both countries. In theory, of 
course, this is just one of the many (in fact, sixteen) possibilities that exist. Indeed, when 
certain taxes are too high or there is too much other traffic using the same road, some 
types of transport demand may disappear, affecting the structure of the remaining 
demand functions. This is a well-known problem in the tax competition literature (see 
Mintz and Tulkens, 1986). However, many of these cases are not very interesting in 
practice (e.g., cases where there is no local traffic, cases where there is no transit in 
neither A or B). We therefore largely focus on the most relevant case where both types of 
transport exist in both countries. 
 
2.2. Optimal tolls in a parallel network: the case of differentiated tolls 
Assume each country can set different tolls on local transport and on transit on its 
territory. To study the optimal tolls set by, say, country A, we use the properties of the   9
reduced-form demand system for the different types of transport in the first-order 
conditions for welfare optimisation in country A. 
The reduced-form demand system is obtained by solving the equilibrium conditions (2), 
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                                                             (5) 
In Appendix 1 we show that these demand functions have the following properties:  
0 ,00 ,0
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0 ,00 ,0



















                              (7) 
Increasing local transport taxes in a given country raises demand and reduces transit; it 
raises transit and reduces local demand abroad. Higher transit taxes in a country have the 
opposite effects. The intuition is easy, realising that any tax change has two effects: first, 
it affects the distribution of transit over the two routes and, second, by affecting 
congestion levels in the two regions, it has an impact on the competition in each country 
between transit traffic and local traffic for the same road space. An example helps to 
illustrate this. Take the effect of increasing the transit tax in B (τB ). This tax increase will 
make route B less interesting for transit traffic so that  B X  goes down, whereas demand 
for transit on route A rises. However, there are secondary effects. The positive effect on 
XA raises congestion in A and hence the generalised user cost, whereas the lower volume 
of transit on route B decreases the generalised cost of using route B. The changes in   10
congestion mitigate the initial transit effects described before; more importantly, they 
raises the demand for local traffic in country B and reduce demand for local transport  A Y .  
Finally, in Appendix 1 we also show the following useful result on the relative impact 









   
Both taxes have opposite effects, but in absolute value the transit tax has a larger effect 
on transit demand than an increase in the tax on local traffic. This makes intuitive sense 
because a higher local tax only affects transit demand indirectly via the induced reduction 
in congestion. This finding will be useful for the interpretation later.  
Using the reduced-form demand system, we then proceed to analyse the optimal 
behaviour of a given country, conditional on the tolls set abroad. We assume that the 
appropriate welfare function used by each of the governments consists of the sum of 
consumer surplus for the local users plus the total tax revenues earned on local and transit 
traffic on its territory. Consumer surplus for foreigners is assumed to be ignored. 
Consider, therefore, the problem of country A: 








A AA A A A A A A A t Max W P Y dY g Y t Y X
τ τ =− + + ∫ ,                        (8)   
where, see before,  ( )
Y
A AA A A gC XYt =+ + , and the reduced-form demands for  A X  and A Y  
depend on all four tax rates, see (5). Moreover, the country takes the tolls  , BB t τ  in 
country B as given. 










  ∂∂ ∂∂
−+ −=   ∂∂ ∂∂  
,                          (9) 
0
rr








  ∂∂ ∂∂
−+ −+ =   ∂∂ ∂∂  
,               (10)   11
where  AA A VXY =+  is the total (local plus transit) traffic volume in country A. In 
Appendix 1 we show that (9) and (10) imply the following results (analogous results hold 

























  ∂   =−
∂∂  
  ∂∂  
                                   (12) 
                                                   AA t τ > .                                                                          (13) 
 
In these expressions,  A LMEC  is the local direct marginal external congestion cost, 
defined as: 











It captures the effect of extra traffic on the generalised user cost in country A, multiplied 
by the number of local users of the link. It is a direct marginal external cost in that it does 
not take into account feedback effects on demand. Note that country A does not consider 
the time losses imposed on transit traffic through A as part of the relevant local marginal 
external cost. 
Expressions (11), (12) and (13) imply that the local and transit tolls both exceed the 
local marginal external cost; moreover, the transit toll is strictly larger than the local toll. 
These results immediately follows from the signs of the reduced-form demand price 
effects, see (6) and (7). Transit taxes higher than taxes on local transport are consistent 
with the tax competition literature; they simply reflect tax exporting behaviour (see, e.g., 
Arnott and Grieson (1981), Wilson (1999)). However, that the local toll exceeds LMEC 
is follows from the interaction of local and transit demand in generating congestion. As a 
consequence, the true opportunity cost of an increase in local traffic not only covers the   12
local direct marginal external cost but also the opportunity cost of the lost tax revenues 
on transit: more local traffic implies higher congestion and hence less transit demand.
6  
 
2.3. Optimal tolls in a parallel network: uniform tolls 
Suppose countries are limited to uniform tolls, i.e., the toll is restricted to be the same for 
local and transit trips. Denote the uniform tolls by  A θ  and  B θ  in regions A and B, 
respectively, where ( , ) ii i ti A B θ τ == = .  
Solving the equilibrium conditions (2), (3) and (4) for the case of uniform tolls now 

























                                                           (5bis) 
In Appendix 2 we show that the reduced-form demand functions for A (analogous results 
hold for B) have the following properties: 










                                                 
6 Note that, for the specific model structure considered here, it turns out that the local tax equals the 











.    
The global marginal external cost is the increase in generalised cost from an extra unit of traffic, multiplied 
by the total number of road users in A. That the local tax exceeds the local marginal external cost is a 
general result, that it precisely equals the global marginal external cost is an artefact of the model structure. 
The intuition can be understood by the definition of the generalised cost in combination with the structure 
of the objective function. Transit traffic is indifferent between paying one Euro more in time costs and one 
Euro more in transit tolls. The government that hosts the transit traffic obviously prefers the transit toll. 
Therefore, the opportunity cost of allowing one more unit of local traffic equals the local marginal external 
cost plus the total transit revenue foregone through the increase in average costs for transit traffic. The 
definition of generalised costs implies that the increase in average costs (the marginal external cost of the 
transit traffic) equals the total transit revenue foregone. 
   13
Again, an increase in the uniform tax in a region is expected to have a double effect on 
transit (local) demand in that region: a direct negative effect, and an indirect positive 
effect due to the lower volume of local (transit) traffic. The above results show that the 
former effect dominates the indirect feedback effect
7.   Moreover, we also find that an 
increase in the uniform tax abroad (e.g. in B) raises transit demand but reduces local 
demand (e.g., in A). The reason is simply that overall transit demand is shifted from B to 
A, which in turn raises congestion in A and hence lowers local demand in A. 
To determine the optimal uniform toll for country A, consider the first-order condition 
to the problem 
                                    
0





A AA A A A A A A Max W P Y dY g Y Y X
θ θ =− + + ∫  
This can be written as, after simple manipulation (see Appendix 2): 













∂ ∂ ∂ +
∂ ∂
 
It immediately follows that AA LMEC θ > , unless transit in A is zero. The optimal uniform 
toll exceeds the local direct marginal external cost, and it rises with transit. Again, except 
for the role of congestion, this is in line with the earlier tax competition literature. 
Intuitively, the toll balances the distortion on the local transport market and the revenue 
opportunities on transit.  
 
2.4.  Optimal tolls in a parallel network: the case of local tolls only 
Suppose the government cannot tax transit ( 0( , ) i iA B τ = = ). The equilibrium conditions 
(2), (3) and (4) can then be solved for the system of reduced form demand functions that 
depend on the local tolls in both countries: 
                                                 
7 For transit, this is in line with our earlier finding that, in the case of differentiated taxes, in absolute value 





















                                                 (5ter) 
The signs of these demand equations are identical to the reduced demand functions of the 
differentiated toll case. Own price effects are negative, cross price effects positive. 
The first-order condition to the problem for country A: 
                                    
0




















  ∂∂   =+
∂ ∂  
  ∂  
 
where the term between square brackets is shown to be positive (see Appendix 3). Using 
the signs of the demand functions this implies that the tax is positive but smaller than 
local marginal external cost: 
 0 AA tL M E C < <  
This result underscores the importance of the interaction between local and transit 
traffic. To understand the intuition, note that the toll reduces local transport demand, a 
welfare-raising correction for the externality this traffic imposes. However, the reduction 
in local traffic reduces the average time cost for transit and attracts more transit; this 
decreases local welfare and induces a tax below LMEC. If transit traffic reacts very 
strongly to an average travel time cost decrease, it may be optimal to set the tax very low 
so as to avoid attracting too much transit. Note that, if the local toll had no affect on 
transit, a toll equal to LMEC would be optimal.  
  
   15
2.5. Optimal tolls under various tolling systems: summary   
Table 2 and Theorem 1 below summarise the main findings of this section under the 




a. Optimal differentiated tolls imply that (i) local and transit tolls both exceed the 
local marginal external cost; (ii) the transit toll is strictly larger than the local toll. 
b. The optimal uniform toll exceeds the local marginal external cost. Moreover, it 
will be higher the more important is transit traffic through the country. 
c. If only local traffic can be tolled, the optimal toll is positive but smaller than the 
local marginal external cost. 
 
Results show that a wide range of optimal tolling schemes is possible. Some of these may 
well be consistent with observed practice. For example, the use of vignettes in some 
countries comes close to the idea of tax differentiation, and it indeed implies the potential 
for tax exporting to foreigners. Importantly, our findings may help to explain why small 
open economies unable to tax transit favour taxes on local traffic that are substantially 
below marginal congestion costs. In fact, such countries are often slow to accept 
congestion taxes or are even explicitly opposed to their introduction, unless transit can 
also be taxed (Belgium, Netherlands, etc.). The results presented here for the case ‘local 
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Table 2: Summary of optimal tolling rules 
Tolling regime  Results  on 
optimal tolls 
Interpretation 
Differentiated tolls  ii LMEC τ >  
ii tL M E C >  
ii t τ >  
-  Local and transit toll exceed local 
marginal external congestion cost  
- Transit toll exceeds local toll 
Uniform tolls  ii i t θ τ ==  
ii LMEC θ >  
- Uniform toll exceeds local marginal 
external congestion cost 
Local tolls only  0 ii tL M E C <<  
 
- Tolls on local traffic are positive but 




3. Nash equilibria for linear cost and demand functions 
The optimal tax rules derived in the previous section under different tolling systems 
implicitly define countries’ reaction functions to taxes abroad. To formally study their 
properties and to analyse the resulting Nash equilibria, it is instructive to impose more 
structure on the problem. In this section we therefore focus on linear demand and cost 
functions. These simplifications also pave the way for the numerical analysis that follows 
in Section 4. 
  Specifically, we use the following linear inverse demand functions: 




,, , , , 0
X
Y
AA A A A
Y
BB B B B
AA BB
PX a b X
PY c d Y
PY c d Y





                                                 (14) 
Cost functions for transport time (and resources) are specified as: 




A AA A A AA
BB B B BB B
CX Y X Y








                                                                     (15) 
As before, we only consider the general case where both regions have transit and local 
transport. The algebraic derivations to arrive at the reaction functions and to show the   17
existence of a Nash equilibrium for the various tolling regimes are conceptually 
simple, but somewhat tedious. We have therefore delegated the derivations to Appendix 4 
and limited the discussion here to the economic implications of our findings. 
 
3.1. Reaction functions and Nash equilibrium: differentiated tolls 
The reaction functions for country A ( analogous results hold for B) are given by the 
following linear expressions: 












AA B B AA
AA
tA A
AA B B AA
ct









                    (16) 
where the coefficients are explicitly defined in Appendix 4. Here it suffices to note: 
124 0, 0, 0
AAA γγγ < ><  
24
AA γ γ >  
10
A K − <<  
Interpretation of the signs of the foreign taxes on optimal local taxes in A is then clear. 
We find that an increase in the transit tax abroad induces country A to optimally adjust 
both its transit tax and the tax on local traffic upwards, but that the impact on the transit 
tax is larger than the effect on the local tax. Why is this the case? The higher tax on 
transit in B reduces transit there and raises transit demand in A. This increases local 
congestion in A. The optimal response in A is therefore to raise both taxes. Similarly, a 
higher local tax in B induces country A to optimally reduce transit as well as local taxes 
in A. The higher tax in B reduces congestion in B and makes B relatively more and A 
relatively less attractive to transit traffic. This also reduces both congestion and tax 
revenues in A. To compensate country A raises its tax rate on local traffic; this increases 
congestion but raises tax revenues.  
In Appendix 4 we formally show existence of a Nash equilibrium. Not surprisingly, 
explicitly solving for the equilibrium tax rates does not yield extra economic insights.   18
Therefore, to study the properties of the equilibrium in function of a number of crucial 
parameters describing the tax competition problem (e.g., the size of the country, the 
importance of transit etc.), we resort to numerical analysis in Section 4 below. 
 
3.2.Reaction functions and Nash equilibrium: uniform tolls 
The reaction function for country A as a function of the uniform tax rate in B is given by 




A B tuA tuA
c c
cc
θ θ =+                                                    (17) 
where (see Appendix 4)  1 0
tuA c > ,  2 0
tuA c > , 3 0
tuA c > . An analogous result holds for B. This 
shows that the reaction functions are upward sloping. A Nash equilibrium can again be 
shown to exist.  
 
3.3.Reaction functions and Nash equilibrium: local tolls only 








=+                                                         (18) 
where  1 0
tlA c > ,  2 0
tlA c > ,  3 0
tlA c > . 
Again, the slope of the reaction functions is positive, and (assuming both types of traffic 
exist at the equilibrium) existence of a Nash equilibrium can be shown, see Appendix 4.  
 
 
4. Numerical illustration 
In order to illustrate the theoretical analysis, a numerical model is used that fully 
corresponds to the linear model developed in the previous section.  The data represent 
realistic orders of magnitude for the situations modelled above, but they do not   19
correspond to one particular real-world example. The advantage of such a ‘generic’ 
application is that it allows us to numerically illustrate the sensitivity of the results with 
respect to the importance of transit and to series of parameters that reflect some observed 
real-world differences between countries.  
We start the discussion by analysing a central and fully symmetric scenario, and then 
consecutively consider the role of transit, of asymmetric local demand functions 
(reflecting differences in the relation between local demand and road capacity) and of 
differences in congestion functions. For each of the scenarios considered, the following 
equilibria are calculated: 
  S1: The no toll equilibrium, to which the model is calibrated; 
  S2: Nash equilibrium with differentiated tolls; 
  S3: Nash-equilibrium with uniform tolls on local and transit traffic;  
  S4: Nash equilibrium with local tolls only; 
  S5: Centralized solution with differentiated tolls  
  S6: Centralized solution with local tolls only.  
In each scenario, the toll revenue is allocated to the tolling countries. Note that, by 
construction, we obtain interior solutions for the counterfactual scenarios.  
 
4.1 Central  scenario 
The central scenario uses a fully symmetric version of the model, with identical 
congestion and local demand functions for both countries.  The congestion function is a 
linear approximation to the French functional form for highways (Quinet (1998, p. 139)), 
at a reasonably congested traffic volume.  The precise parameterization of all cost and 
demand functions is chosen so as to yield reasonable generalized price elasticities and 
congestion levels (including marginal external congestion cost); cf. more detail below.  In 
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addition to symmetry, the central case also assumes a 50/50 distribution of transit and 
local traffic in each country, in the zero-toll reference situation.  
Table 3 shows some basic properties of the demand and cost functions used, and the 
associated reference demand and cost levels. Note that transit demand is twice local 
demand in A or B and it is, endogenously, equally distributed over both countries.  The 
time cost is taken to be 50% of the generalized price.  The non-time component is fixed 
across simulations. 
 
Table 3 Zero-toll symmetric equilibrium (central case parameterization) 
 Intercept  Slope  Level  Unit 
Local demand, A=B  1690  -5.96  1300  Trips 
Transit demand  3380  -11.92  2600  Trips 
Time cost function, A=B  1.617  0.012  32.7  Euro/trip 
Generalized price, A=B      65.4  Euro/trip 
Local MEC, A=B      15.5  Euro/trip 
Global MEC, A=B      31.1  Euro/trip 
Note: all trips are taken to be 100km long; the trip levels are hourly levels 
 
Calculated results for each of the six equilibria leads to the results summarized in 
Tables 4 and 5. They are easily summarized. Reassuringly, the optimal tolls nicely 
illustrate a number of results of the theoretical analysis. For example, at the centralised 
solution (S5) both transit and local tolls equal global marginal external cost. Note that, 
while toll differentiation is allowed in scenario S5, the resulting tolls are equal because 
marginal external costs are equal for both trip types. In the Nash equilibrium with 
differentiated tolls (S2), both the local and global toll exceed the local marginal external 
cost (the local toll is equal to the global marginal external congestion cost), and the transit 
toll exceeds the local toll. In the corresponding solution with uniform tolls (S3) the 
optimal toll is between the toll levels of the differentiated case. Interestingly, the optimal 
local toll is very low in the Nash equilibrium case where transit remains un-tolled: it 
amounts to 6.8 Euro relative to a global marginal external cost of 30.7.     
Turn to the relative welfare levels at the different equilibria. First, observe that the Nash 
equilibrium with differentiated tolls is able to generate a large percentage of the maximal 
possible welfare gain. To see this, note that the maximal welfare gain (the gain at the   21
centralised solution S5) relative to the no-toll reference equilibrium amounts to 1.58% 
of this reference welfare level. The Nash-equilibrium with differentiated tolls improves 
overall welfare by 1.47% compared to the reference case, or 93% of the maximal 
attainable gain. Moreover, the shares of both countries and of transit in total welfare are 
also fairly close to that of the centralised solution.  In both cases the shares of local traffic 
in welfare increase substantially compared to the no-toll situation, while that of transit 
traffic diminishes.
8 Our finding that the Nash equilibrium with differentiated tolls brings 
us close to the social welfare optimum implies that the welfare costs of the lack of 
coordination between countries seem to be relatively modest. A similar conclusion was 
obtained in totally different contexts by Sorensen (2000) and Parry (2003). At any rate, 
tolling with no coordination is much better than no tolling at all. 
Second, comparing the Nash equilibrium with and without toll differentiation (S2 and 
S3) suggests that the uniformity constraint implies a very small overall welfare loss 
(0.06%-point), despite a substantial impact on the local toll. This increases from 27.1 
Euro/trip to 36.8 Euro/trip, close to the transit toll of 37.9 in the differentiated tolling 
case. However, this hardly affects welfare compared to the differentiated tolling case. 
Local welfare goes down only marginally because the reduction in local consumer 
surplus is almost fully offset by the increase in tax revenues, which have the same 
welfare weight as consumer surplus. Transit experiences only a modest welfare gain 
relative to the differentiated tolling case; the reason is that the toll on transit is quite 
similar under both the uniform and the differentiated tolling case. The results indicate that 
the overall welfare effects of uniform versus differentiated tolls are quite similar, 
although the distribution between local and transit welfare obviously substantially differs. 
Finally, the uniformity restriction does not protect transit from substantial welfare losses 
compared to the no toll situation.  
Third, consider the cases where transit trips cannot be tolled. These scenarios are of 
interest because zero tolls on transit traffic mimics current (and possibly future) 
                                                 
8 The resulting welfare loss for transit could be expected, as transit trips are priced below marginal social 
costs in the reference equilibrium.  A toll is needed for reasons of efficiency, but transit does not share in 
the toll revenues.   22
conditions in Europe, at least for transit countries that are small enough to allow transit 
to pass without taking fuel. We find the performance of both the Nash and the centralised 
outcome (S4 and S6) to be substantially worse than in the cases where transit is tolled.  
The Nash equilibrium without transit tolls (S4) generates only 21.5% of the maximal 
possible welfare gain (S5) and 23% of the welfare gain in the Nash equilibrium with 
differentiated tolls (S2).  Note also that the centralised solution with zero transit tolls 
performs worse than both the Nash equilibria with and without toll differentiation. 
Our findings suggest, therefore, that welfare losses are much more substantial when 
transit remains un-tolled than when tolls on local and transit transport are required to be 
uniform. Moreover, it also seems that not tolling transit, a substantial fraction of total 
traffic, is equally if not more important for welfare than tax competition itself. Moving 
from the centralised solution with taxes on both local and transit traffic to a centralised 
situation with no toll on transit (compare S5 and S6), we see that the tax on local traffic 
only falls marginally below marginal external cost. The large welfare difference is 
uniquely due to un-tolled transit. Introducing tax competition under the zero transit toll 
constraint then does introduce an additional welfare loss (compare S6 and S4): countries 
find it in their best interest to tax local traffic at far less than the global marginal external 
congestion cost.  As countries care about local welfare only, they set local tolls at a low 
level, so encouraging local trip demand and indirectly discouraging transit trips. 
To summarise, our numerical findings so far indicate that: 
- It is important to introduce some form of transit tolling; the welfare effects of 
tolling transit are large. 
- The precise type of transit tolling (uniform local and transit tolls versus 
differentiated transit tolls) has relatively small welfare effects. 
- The welfare losses due to not tolling transit seem to be at least as important as the 
losses due to tax competition itself.  
- A uniformity restriction for local and transit tolls does not protect transit from large 
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4.2  The importance of the share of transit in the no-toll equilibrium 
The transit share in the central scenario was 50% in both countries. In this sub-section we 
briefly illustrate the impact of changing the relative importance of transit; apart from that, the 
countries are still assumed to be symmetric.  
First consider Figure 2 below. This shows, for the Nash equilibrium tolls with differentiated 
tolling, the effects of varying the share of transit between 1% and 50%, while keeping the no-
toll total traffic volumes at the levels of the central scenario (so this reflects ‘constant 
congestion’ compared to the central scenario). We see that the transit toll rises dramatically as 
the share of transit increases, while the local transit toll slightly declines. This latter effect 
follows from the higher transit toll which leads to lower traffic levels and, therefore, lower 
(global) marginal external costs. Finally, note that as the transit share goes to zero, the model 
converges to marginal social cost pricing for both transport types.   
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Next, we try to find out if the qualitative results concerning the welfare impacts of various 
pricing constraints depend on the importance of transit. In order to do this, in Tables 6 and 7 
we reconsider scenarios S1 – S6 for a reference transit share of 10% (instead of 50% in Tables 
4 and 5). Except for those already mentioned, the qualitative differences are limited, with 
three exceptions. First, the lower transit share induces a much higher local toll in the Nash 
equilibrium with zero tolls on transit. The reason is that, for a given increase in tax revenue on September 9, 2003  14:32:25 
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local traffic, the increase in congestion due to rising transit is smaller than before. Second, the 
welfare loss from not coordinating between countries (compare S2 and S5) is even smaller 
than in the central scenario, as there is less transit and therefore less of a conflict between 
local and global welfare. Third, not surprisingly, with low transit shares the inability to toll 
transit traffic is much less detrimental than in the central scenario. In scenario S4, the Nash 
equilibrium with a local toll only, 62% of the gain from the gain in the Nash equilibrium with 
differentiation (S2) is obtained. It is still the case that the Nash equilibrium with uniform tolls 
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4.3  The effects of asymmetry between countries 
4.3.1 Asymmetrical local demand functions 
In this sub-section we consider the effect of differences between countries in local 
demand functions. More precisely, (i) the transit demand function is assumed to be the 
same as before; (ii) the sum of local demand over both countries is the same as before; 
(iii) but, local demand in country A is decreased and that in country B is increased (in the 
reference case, the no-toll equilibrium). The local demand functions are adapted 
accordingly (implying both a shift and a change in slope, as the reference elasticity of 
demand is held constant).  
To interpret the economics of the simulations reported here, note that aggregate trip 
demand for the whole network in the no-toll equilibrium is held at the level of the central 
scenario, but that only the distribution of local traffic (and, as a consequence, of 
equilibrium transit demand) between countries is changed. In other words, we look at 
differences in local demand relative to the available road capacity: for any given level of 
transit demand, country A has lower congestion than country B. Therefore, the scenario 
could be interpreted as the case of a densely (B) populated versus a sparsely (A) 
populated country. Given constant road capacity, more transit is automatically attracted 
to A. The scenario therefore also reflects differences in the potential of countries to 
attract transit.   
In order to keep the analysis transparent, we limit the discussion to the effects of the 
described asymmetry for the reference zero toll scenario and for the Nash equilibrium 
with differentiated tolls. Results are in Table 8, the structure of which is necessarily 
somewhat different from earlier tables. The top part of the table first describes the effects 
of the asymmetry on the reference equilibrium when we decrease, from left to right, local 
demand in country A; correspondingly, local demand in B rises. Since road capacity does 
not change, a larger share of overall transit demand, which is constant, is attracted to 
Country A. By construction, the local marginal congestion cost in Country A decreases, 
that in Country B increases and, in the reference equilibrium, the generalized cost and the 
global marginal congestion costs are the same as in the central scenario in both countries. September 9, 2003  14:32:25 
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To get insight into the effects of asymmetric demands, the bottom part of Table 8 gives, 
for different levels of asymmetry, the optimal tolls for the Nash equilibrium with 
differentiated tolls. Moreover, it presents changes in demand, marginal cost and welfare 
when moving from the reference scenario to the Nash outcome. The most relevant results 
are the following. First, asymmetry implies a lower local toll and a higher transit toll in 
the low-demand Country A, with the opposite directions of change in Country B.   
Second, its attractiveness for transit implies that global marginal congestion costs in 
Country A rise (they decrease less compared to the symmetric reference); the opposite 
holds for B. However, note in both cases that the magnitude of these effects is limited 
even at very high levels of asymmetry. Third, the effect of the asymmetry on the total 
transit demand reduction is very small. Not surprisingly, as Country A carries more 
transit flow (in relative and in absolute terms), moving from the reference case to the 
Nash equilibrium implies a larger reduction in its share in total transit flow.  Fourth, the 
gain from introducing the Nash differentiated tolls in Country A strongly rises when its 
local willingness to pay for trips becomes smaller; correspondingly, the gains for Country 
B become smaller.  The reduction in total transit welfare after introduction of the 
differentiated tolls hardly depends on the asymmetry. 
The economic interpretation is clear. This exercise suggests that a country which is in a 
position to attract a lot of transit traffic, because it has high road capacity and/or little 
local demand, will benefit a lot from a differentiated toll on local and transit traffic
9.  The 
competitive advantage that follows from having sufficient capacity that is not yet 
congested by local users, enables the country to raise substantial amounts of toll revenue 
from transit users, so increasing local welfare.  The welfare potential of the competing 
country decreases, but transit users are hardly affected.  
                                                 
9 This example also suggests that countries may have strategic incentives for provision of infrastructure. 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 September 9, 2003  14:32:25 
X:\USERS\JOHAN EYCKMANS\ETE-WORKING PAPERS\ETE-WP-2003-09\DBPVDTAXCOMPJOURN.DOC 
30
4.3.2 Asymmetrical congestion functions 
Finally, we test the sensitivity of the results to differences in the congestion functions between 
countries.  The scenario analysed is the following: (i) the congestion function for Country B is 
the same as in the central scenario; (ii) for Country A, the slope is decreased, simultaneously 
increasing the intercept in order to retain the volumes and travel times (in both countries) of 
the central scenario. Consequently, we reduce the ‘congestibility’ of the road in Country A, 
but the fixed component of travel time is simultaneously increased.   
The economic interpretation of the constructed scenario is straightforward. It could be 
interpreted as introducing an asymmetry in the relative length and, at given traffic levels, 
degrees of congestion. The proposed adjustment has the same effect as making the road via 
Country A longer but less congested (at given traffic levels) compared to the link via country 
B. Loosely speaking, at given levels of local demand, transit now has the choice between a 
longer trip with potentially less congestion and a shorter but more congested route. From the 
viewpoint of transit, given the unchanged parameters for country B, the changes for A imply 
that the congestibility of the whole network declines. 
Consider Table 9, which has the same structure as Table 8 above. Column A is the central 
scenario. In columns B through D, the slope of the congestion function of Country A is 
gradually reduced by 5 to 15% and the intercept is adapted to keep reference volumes and 
distributions constant (see the top half of the table).  In column E, the slope of the congestion 
function of Country A is reduced to epsilon, implying a virtual absence of congestion. The 
main results are in the bottom half of the table. First, introducing the asymmetry reduces all 
the optimal tolls, reflecting the decline in congestion at given traffic levels. Second, the 
effects are largest for the local tolls in the least congested Country A; tolls in B are much less 
sensitive. Third, the welfare effects of the asymmetry in congestion functions for the Nash 
equilibrium with toll differentiation are limited (both local and transit welfare), except in the 
extreme case of zero congestion in A (column E). The local welfare gains from the tolls 
decrease, which could be expected as the initial inefficiency from congestion becomes smaller 
with the network capacity increase. Overall, the simulation results suggest that countries with 
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5. Summary, conclusions and directions for future research 
In this paper we studied optimal and strategic pricing of local and transit traffic on a simple 
parallel network. The tolling authority on the individual links of the network was assumed to 
be assigned to different countries. We first theoretically analysed Nash equilibria in this 
setting for three types of pricing structures: differentiated tolls between local and transit 
traffic, uniform tolls, and local tolls only. Then a numerical model was used to illustrate the 
main results and to assess the welfare effects of various pricing constraints and of (the lack of) 
coordination between countries. Moreover, the relevance of the share of transit in total 
transport demand and of asymmetries between countries was numerically illustrated.  
  The conclusions are easily summarised. First, the welfare effects of tolling transit seem to be 
large, but the precise type of transit tolling has relatively small effects on efficiency 
improvements compared to the no tolling situation. Specifically, differentiation between local 
and transit tolls as compared to uniform tolls does not yield large welfare differences, 
although obviously tolls on transit may differ substantially. Allowing differentiated tolls in an 
uncoordinated setting tends to go at the expense of transit traffic. Second, the welfare effects 
of coordination between countries are relatively small in comparison with the welfare gains of 
tolling transit. The outcome when countries behave strategically but do tax transit (e.g., the 
Nash equilibrium with uniform tolls) yields higher welfare effects than the coordinated 
welfare optimum for the network as a whole when transit is not tolled. Third, the effect of 
higher transit shares on the Nash equilibrium with differentiated tolls is to strongly raise the 
transit toll and to slightly decrease the local toll. As the transit share goes to zero, the model 
converges to marginal social cost pricing for local traffic. Fourth, the impact of introducing 
asymmetries between countries is to raise welfare gains for the country with lower local 
demand (comparing the Nash-equilibrium to the no-toll equilibrium); welfare gains in the 
other country become less pronounced.  
  Finally, note that this paper could be extended along several lines. First, we have limited the 
analysis to cases where at all equilibria both local and transit transport occur in both regions. 
Although the case of zero local traffic is not very interesting, allowing corner solutions at zero 
transit does seem a relevant case to consider. Under specific conditions, countries could 
actually choose to eliminate all transit on their territory. Studying these conditions seems a 
relevant addition to the analysis of this paper. Second, different pricing instruments (road September 9, 2003  14:32:25 
X:\USERS\JOHAN EYCKMANS\ETE-WORKING PAPERS\ETE-WP-2003-09\DBPVDTAXCOMPJOURN.DOC 
33
pricing, fuel taxes, vignettes, etc.) could be introduced. This would probably make the 
theoretical analysis intractable, but it would enrich the numerical results. Third, one could 
incorporate freight transport and analyse partial taxation of the network (e.g., toll trucks but 
not passengers). Fourth, the transition process of introducing tolling instruments sequentially 
could be explicitly studied. For example, given that one country moves from a system with 
local tolls only to a system with explicit transit tolling, how does this affect optimal responses 
by the other country? Alternatively, if a country moves from differentiated tolls towards 
uniform tolls, what is the optimal response for the other country? What do the resulting Nash 
equilibria look like? 
 
References 
Arnott, R. and R. Grieson (1981), Optimal fiscal policy for a state and local government,                    
Journal of Urban Economics 9, 23-48. 
Arnott, R., De Palma, A. and R. Lindsay (1993), A structural model of peak-period 
congestion, American Economic Review 83, 161-179. 
Braid, R. (1996), Peak-load pricing of a transportation route with an unpriced substitute, 
Journal of Urban Economics 40, 179-197. 
De Borger, B. and S. Proost, Eds.  (2001), Reforming transport pricing in the European 
Union, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
De Borger, B., Courcelle, C. and D. Swysen (forthcoming 2003), Optimal pricing of transport 
externalities in an international environment: empirical evidence based on a numerical 
optimisation model, Regional Science and Urban Economics. 
de Palma, A. and R. Lindsey (2000), Private toll roads: a dynamic equilibrium analysis, 
Annals of Regional Science, 34, 1, 13-35 
Kanbur, A. and M. Keen (1993), Jeux sans frontières: tax competition when countries differ 
in size, American Economic Review 83, 877-892. 
Levinson D., 2001, Why States Toll – An empirical model of finance choice, Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policy, 35, 2, 223-238 
Liu, L. and J.F. McDonald (1998), Efficient congestion tolls in the presence of unpriced 
congestion: a peak and off-peak simulation model, Journal of Urban Economics 44, 352-
366. September 9, 2003  14:32:25 
X:\USERS\JOHAN EYCKMANS\ETE-WORKING PAPERS\ETE-WP-2003-09\DBPVDTAXCOMPJOURN.DOC 
34
Mintz, J. and H. Tulkens (1986), Commodity taxation between member states of a federation: 
equilibrium and efficiency, Journal of Public Economics 29, 173-197. 
Parry, I., 2003, How large are the welfare costs of tax competition, Journal of Urban 
Economics 54, 39-60. 
Quinet E., 1998, Principes d’Economie des Transports, Economica, Paris 
Sinn H.-W., 2003, The New Systems Competition, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, UK, 228 pp. 
Small, K. (1983), The incidence of congestion tolls, Journal of Urban Economics 13, 90-111. 
Small, K. and Yan (2001), The value of “Value Pricing” of roads: second best pricing and 
product differentiation, (working paper RFF 00-08, January 2000), JUE ??? 
Sorensen, P. (2000), Tax coordination: its desirability and redistributional implications, 
Economic Policy 15, 431-472. 
Verhoef, E., Nijkamp, P. and P. Rietveld (1996), Second-best congestion pricing: the case of 
an untolled alternative, Journal of Urban Economics 40, 279-302. 
Verhoef, E. and K. Small (2003), Product differentiation on roads: second-best congestion 
pricing with heterogeneity under public and private ownership, Irvine economics paper 
99-00-01 
Wildasin, D. (1989), Interjurisdictional capital mobility: fiscal externality and a corrective 
subsidy, Journal of Urban Economics 25, 193-213. 
Wilson, J.S. (1999), Theories of tax competition, National Tax Journal LII, 269-304. September 9, 2003  14:32:25 
X:\USERS\JOHAN EYCKMANS\ETE-WORKING PAPERS\ETE-WP-2003-09\DBPVDTAXCOMPJOURN.DOC 
35
   
Appendix 1: Detailed analysis of the case of differentiated tolls 
In this appendix we study in more detail the case of differentiated tolls on local and transit 
transport. We derive the reduced form demand system and discuss its properties, and we 
derive the optimal toll results presented in the main body of the paper.  
 
The reduced-form demand system 
Using (1) and focusing on the case where there is local and transit traffic in both regions, the 
system consisting of (2), (3) and (4) can be reformulated as 
                                                        ( ) ( )
X
A BA A A A PX X CX Y τ += + +                                (A.1) 
 () ( )
X
A BB B B B PX X CX Y τ += + +               ( A . 2 )  
 () ( )
Y
A AA A A A PY CX Y t = ++                    ( A . 3 )  
 () ( )
Y
BB B B B B PY CX Y t = ++                    ( A . 4 )  
This system of four equations can easily be solved for the reduced form demand functions as 
functions of the four tax rates. A particularly instructive way to do this is to first solve (A.3) 
and (A.4) separately for the demands for local transport as a function of transit demands and 
local tax rates in a given region: 
(, ) AA A A Yz X t =                           ( A . 5 )  
(, ) BB B B Yz X t =                           ( A . 6 )  
Note that application of the implicit function theorem to (A.3) implies: 















                                    ( A . 7 )  














                                                   (A.8)   
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                         AA A VXY = +  
is the total transport volume in A. Using (A.4), an analogous result is derived for B. 
Interpretation is simple: an exogenous increase in transit in a given region reduces the demand 
for local transport, as it raises local congestion and hence generalised user cost.   Raising  the 
local tax, at a given transit level, reduces local demand for transport.  
Substituting (A.5)-(A.6) into (A.1) and (A.2) yields:  
                                                        [ ] () ( , )
X
A BA A A A AA PX X CX zXt τ += + +    (A.9) 
[ ] () ( , )
X
A BB B B B BB PX X CX zXt τ += + +                (A.10) 
The solution of this system yields the reduced-form demand functions for transit, denoted in 
the main body of the paper as  [ ] ,,,
r
A AA BB X tt ττ and  [ ] ,,,
r
BA A B B X tt ττ, respectively. To 
determine the signs of the various tax effects on transit demands, totally differentiate system 











PC z P C z
dt d
XV X X V t dX
dX Cz PP C z dt d
Vt XX V X
τ
τ
 ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   −+ +    ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂     =   ∂∂   ∂∂ ∂ ∂  + −+    ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂    
 
Applying Cramers’ rule then yields, after simple algebra, the effects of tax changes on 




AA A B B
AA A B B
dX C z P C z
dt V t X V X
     ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   =− +      ∆∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂      






dX P C z
dX V X τ
  ∂∂ ∂
=− +   ∆∂ ∂ ∂  





dX P C z
dt X V t
 ∂∂∂
=−  ∆∂ ∂ ∂ 










                                                         (A.14) 
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Cz P CzP Cz
VX X VX X VX
 ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂
∆=− + − + − +  ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ 
 


















which immediately implies   0 ∆> . Note that (A.11)-(A.14) then imply:  
                                      0, 0, 0, 0
rrr r
AA AA AA AA
AA BB AA BB
dX X dX X dX X dX X
ddd t t d t t ττ ττ
∂∂∂ ∂
=< => => =<
∂∂∂ ∂
  









.   









dY z dX z






















so that, using all previous results, it immediately follows: 
                                 0, 0, 0, 0
rrrr
AA AA AA AA
AA BB AA BB
dY Y dY Y dY Y dY Y
ddd t t d t t ττ ττ
∂∂∂∂
=> =< =< =>
∂∂∂∂
 
For the reduced form demand functions for country B, the signs of the different tax effects are 
determined completely analogously. 
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Optimal tax rules 
The first-order conditions to optimisation problem (8) can be written, using the fact that in 
equilibrium generalised cost equals generalised price, as: 









  ∂∂ ∂∂
−+ −=   ∂∂ ∂∂  
                 (A.15)   










  ∂∂ ∂∂
−+ −+ =   ∂∂ ∂∂  
        (A.16) 
Writing the system in matrix notation and solving by Cramers’ rule yields the tax rule for 
local traffic as follows: 












                                   (A.17) 
where 
                                       
rr rr r
AA AA AA
AA A A AA
YX YX zX
D
tt t τ ττ
∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂
=−=
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂
 
The last equality follows from the definition of the various demand effects derived before. 
Substituting D in (A.17) and slightly manipulating the result immediately gives the local tax:  










                                           (A.18) 
Using similar procedures we find for the transit tax 















  ∂ ∂   =−
∂∂ ∂  
  ∂∂  
                                                (A.19) 
Finally, comparison of (A.18) and (A.19) implies that the tax on transit exceeds the tax on 















  ∂ ∂   −= − +
∂∂ ∂  
  ∂∂  
 September 9, 2003  14:32:25 



































    ∂∂ ∂
++     ∂∂ ∂     −= −
  ∂
  ∂    
 
Using (A.11)-(A.12) and explicitly substituting ∆then yields, after some manipulation:  
















  ∂∂ ∂
+   ∂∂ ∂   −= >
  ∂∂ ∂
−+   ∂∂ ∂   
 
 
Appendix 2: Detailed analysis of the case of uniform tolls 
Reduced-form demand system 
Using similar developments as in the differentiated tolling case we immediately obtain (the 
definition of  0 ∆>  is unchanged): 
1
1( 1 ) 0
X
AA A B B
AA A B B
dX C z C z P
dV X V X θθ
    ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  =+ − + <    ∆∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂               
    (A.20) 






dX C z P
dX V X θ
  ∂∂ −∂
= +>   ∆∂ ∂ ∂  
                        (A.21) 
Furthermore, analogous procedures as in the case of differentiated taxes immediately yield: 





< <   
Optimal tax rules 
The first-order condition to the problem 
                                    
0





A AA A A A A A A Max W P Y dY g Y Y X
θ θ =− + + ∫ , September 9, 2003  14:32:25 
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can be written as: 
  1( ) ( ) 0
rr r r r r
YY rr AA A A A A A
AA A A A A
AA A A A A A




θθ θ θ θ θ
  ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
−− + + ++ + + =   ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
 

















Appendix 3: Detailed analysis of the case ‘local tolls only’ 
Reduced-form demand system 
The derivatives of the reduced-form demand functions with respect to the local tolls are easily 
shown to be identical to those for the differentiated tolling case. Indeed, the only difference is 
that the transit toll is set to zero. 
 
Optimal tax rules   
The first-order condition to the problem 
                                    
0





A AA A A A A A t Max W P Y dY g Y t Y =− + ∫  









   ∂∂ ∂ ∂
−+ =    ∂∂ ∂ ∂   
  














  ∂∂   =+
∂ ∂  
  ∂  
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Importantly, the term between square brackets can be shown to be positive (and smaller than 
one), implying the optimal tax is between zero and the local marginal external cost. To see 
this, remember that the derivatives of the reduced-form demand functions are given by the 
same expressions A.11 and A.13 as for the differentiated tolling case. Then substitute the 










A AY A A









∂  ∂∂∂ ∂
−+  ∂ ∂∂∂ ∂ 










=− + >  ∂∂ ∂ 
  







  ∂∂ ∂
=− +   ∂∂ ∂  
<0 
It immediately follows that the both the numerator and the denominator of the right-hand side 
of A.22 are positive. .  
 
Appendix 4: Details on the reaction functions and the Nash equilibria 
1. The case of differentiated tolls 
We consecutively derive the reduced-form demands, the reaction functions, and the Nash 
equilibrium. To get the reduced-form demands, we follow the procedure outlined in Appendix 
1 for the linear demand and cost functions given in the main body of the paper. The demands 











                   ( A . 2 3 )  
where September 9, 2003  14:32:25 















          ( A . 2 4 )  














         ( A . 2 5 )  
Substituting these functions in the Wardrop equilibrium conditions yields, after some 
manipulations, the reduced-form demands for transit transport. We find: 
                                       01 2 3 4
r A AAA A
AA B A B X tt γ γτ γτ γ γ =+ + + +                                          (A.26) 
                                       01 2 3 4
r B BBB B
BB A B A X tt γ γτ γτ γ γ =+ + + +                                     (A.27) 





































 +  =−
=
  +   =−
 
=





































 +  =−
=
  +   =−
 
=
    (A.28) 
In these expressions 
AB A B Nb T b T T T =++ , and  11 (1 ), (1 )
AA BB
AB Tz Tz ββ =+ =+ . Since, 
using (A.24)-(A.25), the 
i T  are easily shown to be positive, it immediately follows that N>0. 
Therefore, we have 
                                             1234 0, 0, 0, 0
AAAA γγγγ <>>< . 
                                             1234 0, 0, 0, 0
BBBB γγγγ <>>< . 
Note that the reduced form demand functions have a straightforward structure. More 
precisely, observe that the coefficients of the local and the transit taxes are directly related in 
the following simple manner (i=A,B): September 9, 2003  14:32:25 
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                                                         (A.29) 
Moreover, using (A.24)-(A.25) it immediately follows that  1 10
i z − <<  so that: 









                                                        (A.30) 
Finally, note that reduced form demands for local traffic are obtained by inserting the 
demands for transit (equations (A.26)-(A.27)) into system (A.23). 
The reaction functions are derived as follows. Using the linear demand and cost functions in 
the optimal tax rules for country A derived in Appendix 1, we find after some algebra: 
                                        () AA AA tY X β =+                                                                          (A.31) 
                                        AA AA A YX τ βρ =+                                                                        (A.32) 
where  








Substituting (A.23), (A.26) and (A.27) into (A.31)-(A.32) and solving for the tax rates in A as 
sole functions of the two tax rates in B yields, again after some algebra, 












AA B B AA
AA
tA A
AA B B AA
ct









           ( A . 3 3 )  
where all coefficients have been defined before, except 







































 =+ +  
=
−+
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Moreover, for purposes of the interpretation it is useful to note that  1 0
A K −< < . This is 
easily seen to be the case as follows. First, 













which implies  1 10
AA T γ −< < . This in turn implies  1 0
A K − << . 
  Importantly, since the tax competition problem considered in this section is a game with four 
tax rates, it is not obvious to prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in this 
general setting. Fortunately, the linear structure of the problem allows us to reduce the four-
dimension game into a policy game in two dimensions; moreover, existence and uniqueness 
then immediately follow. To see this, consider the structure of the reaction functions (A.33) 
and note that the local and transit tax rates of each country can be written as a function of the 




































= . Similar expressions result for region B. Noting that only positive  i π  make 
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Simple algebra, using the definitions given before and realising that  1 0
i K − << , then shows 
that the reaction functions have a positive intercept, are upward sloping, and have a slope less 
than one.  Finally, note that solving the reaction functions for the original four tax rates yields 
the Nash equilibrium in function of the various coefficients that describe cost and demand 
responses. The solution is however not transparent and does not yield extra insights. 
 
2. The case of uniform tolls 
We follow the same steps and use the same definitions as in the previous case. The reduced-













                      (A.34) 
The reduced-form demand functions for transit are now the following: 
                                       01 3 2 4 () ()
rA A A A A
AA B X γ γγ θγγ θ =+ + + +                                         (A.35) 
                                       01 3 2 4 () ()
rB B B B B
BB A X γ γγ θγγ θ =+ + + +                                         (A.36) 
where the coefficients are defined as above.  


























in the optimal tax rule derived in Appendix 2:  













∂ ∂ ∂ +
∂ ∂
 
Solving explicitly for the optimal tax, we find the reaction function: 




A B tuA tuA
c c
cc
θ θ =+                                                          (A.37) September 9, 2003  14:32:25 
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where  11 11 3 1( ) ( )
tuA A A A A
AA cz z β ηγ γ =− − + +  
  21 0 0 ()
tuA A A A
AA A cz z βη γ β =++  
  312 4 () ( )
tuA A A A













Tedious algebra shows that ( 1
A
A A z β η + )>0 so that  31 0, 0
tuA tuA cc >> : the reaction functions are 









which, using straightforward algebra, can easily be shown to hold. 
 
3. Local tolls only 
Again we follow the same steps and use the same definitions as in the section for the 












                     (A.38) 
Reduced-form demands for transit are:  
                                       03 4
rA A A
AA B X tt γ γγ =+ +                                                                (A.39) 
                                       03 4
rB B B
BB A X tt γ γγ =+ +                                                           (A.40) 
To get the reaction function for country A, use the above specifications in the optimal tax rule  
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The result turns out to be: 








=+                                                      (A.41) 
where  12 1 3 1( )
tlA A A A
AA cz z β δγ =− +  
  20 1 0 ()
tlA A A A
AA cz z β δγ =+  
  31 4
tlA A A
AA cz β δγ =  
Again, simple but long algebra shows that the slope of the reaction function is positive; 
moreover, assuming all types of transport exist in the equilibrium, the existence of a Nash 








< .    
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